justice.' 2 The opportunity to resolve the merits of a legal claim-what I broadly define as access "-is in jeopardy notwithstanding the preeminence of access as an organizing principle at the founding of the Civil Rules.' 4 Numerous institutions have contributed to this access restriction, and the role of these institutions in civil litigation is well studied. 5 In this article, I focus on a lessexamined institution-the civil rulemaking body-and the role it can play in recovering access. My thesis is that the structure of the rulemaking process should be modified to better facilitate an interpretation of the rulemaking mandate that includes access.
The body of this article is divided into three parts. In Part I, I define access and outline the limits of this definition. Next, in Part II, I provide an account of the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act and the rulemaking process. I demonstrate that the proponents of the Rules Enabling Act and court-based rulemaking designed the rules with access firmly in mind. Access was not the only concern, but by contextualizing the statements of reform proponents, the history shows that access was at least on equal footing with competing concerns like systemic efficiency. Over time, I show that the perception of a litigation explosion, combined with persistent weaknesses of the civil litigation system, have created political pressure to reduce access to the justice system, and that rulemakers have responded by creating rules that do just that.
Finally, in Part HI, I depart from this historical account and turn to a structural discussion of the rulemaking process. I first argue that the rulemaking process should reemphasize access. The historic centrality of access in the genesis and development of rulemaking and the fundamental role of access in procedural efficacy demand such a result. Yet, I argue that the current rulemaking structure is not sufficiently designed to withstand the political pressures exerted on the Committee. I then explore how existing scholarship regarding the structure of the rulemaking process does not adequately address the question of how to put access on par with competing goals. In light of this omission in the literature, I argue that the way to recover access is to completely rethink the structure of the process. I conclude by offering a spectrum of reforms to the structure that have the potential to restore access as a fundamental principle of civil rulemaking. These proposals include modifying the Committee's composition to be more representative of litigants and passing legislation mandating that access be considered in the rulemaking process. 965 , 975 (1998) ("[Tlhere has been a push-and-pull of expansion and contraction of jurisdiction and access during the past twenty years. Since the mid-1970s, however, the greater gravitational force has exerted itself in the direction of higher barriers to court access and full adjudication, particularly in federal court.").
13. For a detailed definition of access, see infra Part I. 14. Or, as Professor Richard L. Marcus has noted, we have a "litigation machine that often seems indifferent to the merits." Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 766 (1993) .
15. See infra Part Il.B.3 for a discussion of these institutions. 
I. ACCESS DEFINED
Access means the opportunity to reach the merits of a legal claim. More specifically, I define access to mean that a litigant's effort to reach a legal resolution should not be obstructed by procedural hurdles that unduly disadvantage one group of litigants over another. This definition applies to both plaintiffs and defendants, as each side should ideally reach the merits of a case on the same terms.
Under my definition, procedural rules can best facilitate access by precluding certain individual and institutional behaviors. Thus, the simplest way to explain how procedural rules can further access is by negative implication. If the rules diminish particular adverse effects, then access to the system is augmented. For ease of discussion, I categorize these adverse effects as follows: (1) tactical; (2) biased; and (3) complexity/cost. First, by tactical, I mean that the rules should not create or encourage their strategic use. Stated another way, even if some degree of tactical behavior is unavoidable, the procedural rules should not reward behavior not intended to get to the substance of the case. Second, by biased, I mean the rules should not be applied disparately. No matter the location of the court nor the identity of the parties, the rules should be the same. Finally, I use the related terms complexity and cost to represent the idea that the rules should not be needlessly convoluted or impose excess cost. The rules of procedure best facilitate access, as I define it, if they preclude or minimize tactical behavior, biased application, and complex/costly effects.
A difficulty with this explanation is that it can collapse into a restatement of the just, speedy, and inexpensive mandate of civil rulemaking. My purpose is not to restate the mandate, but to rethink how it is understood and institutionalized. This is an imperfect exercise because the values that aid interpretation of the mandate overlap with one another. For example, a "speedy" resolution of legal claims can be driven by both access and a competing concern like efficiency. Delay can be used as a tactical weapon to prevent access, but delay can also make the entire system inefficient.' 6 This article does not purport to prioritize access or to argue that access should be an interpretive principle to the exclusion of all others. Rather, I acknowledge that access is one of many competing concerns and argue that we should rethink its interpretive impact when defining what the rulemaking mandate requires.
Having defined access and how the procedural rules intersect with that definition, there are two express caveats to be made. First, the use of "unduly" in the access definition cabins the amount of access that is afforded. If the legal system were completely open, frivolous legal actions would not be deterred and the system could not properly function. Yet, in this article, I do not attempt to define an undue limitation on access. The paradigmatic dilemma of the civil litigation system is the 16 . Just as the mandate terms "just, speedy, and inexpensive" are not mutually exclusive concepts, the words used to interpret the mandate-uniform, efficient, simple, plain, adequate, and fair to name a few-have common characteristics. Access, as I define it, animates many of these terms; for example, plain rules make the justice system more accessible by minimizing the legal expertise required to use them. Yet, plain rules also create systemic efficiencies by decreasing the resources expended on resolving complexity. As this simple example shows, the terminology used to interpret the purpose of the Civil Rules has multiple locutions. 
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proper balance between justice and efficiency, and while this article contributes to that discussion, it does not undertake to resolve this quandary. Second, access, as defined here, does not capture an attempt to equalize resource disparities among litigants." Rather, it only encapsulates the idea that the same system should be available to each litigant and her effort to adjudicate legal claims.
II. HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RULES
In this Part, I apply the access definition articulated above to a brief summary of the history of civil rulemaking. I examine how proponents of the Rules Enabling Act and the drafters of the Civil Rules conceived of access as a fundamental goal of the rules.' I then chronicle how access has diminished as a guiding norm over time.
A. The Rules Enabling Act
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 famously merged law and equity and granted the Supreme Court the power to "prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" for the federal courts.' 9 The history of the Act is already well established in literature, but these accounts do not aim to establish what interpretive principles should guide rulemaking. 2° The following retells a brief version of this rulemaking story in order 17. Equalizing resource disparities is not directly addressed in the procedural rules. There is a good argument that a mechanism like discovery acts like a resource equalizer by, in most cases, requiring the defendant to pay for discovery costs. However, procedures like discovery do not get at the heart of resource inequality in litigation and how society should address that issue by, for example, providing counsel for a low-income litigant or waiving fees for a pro se filer. These questions are better captured by the social justice literature, and while I rely to some extent on that literature's definition of access, I do not intend to engage in a resource distribution debate here. For a detailed discussion about the social justice aspect of access, see, for example, DEBORAH L. RHODE 18. One methodological difficulty bears mentioning. As noted above, the mandate terms "just, speedy, and inexpensive" are not mutually exclusive concepts, nor are the words that proponents used to give these terms meaning. In this historical account, I argue that particular statements demonstrate how access was an important guiding principle of rule reform, but by focusing on access, I do not exclude the possibility that these statements have multiple complementary and contradictory meanings. This summary should be read with that limitation in mind.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 20. Professor Stephen Burbank provides a comprehensive history ofthe Rules Enabling Act to suggest that the purpose of the Act was not to protect federalism principles, but was instead an effort to delegate responsibilities between Congress and the Court. See Burbank, supra note 6, at 1024-26. Burbank's article exhaustively reviews the legislative history of the Act and consults many of the same sources upon which I rely, but does so with an eye towards sussing out the "institutional limits" of the Act's rulemaking authority. 
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to highlight key moments where supporters of the legislation articulated access as one of the guiding principles of procedural reform.
The history breaks down into the following three critical periods: (1) from 1896 to 1913, when the procedural reform movement began and culminated in legislation first being proposed; (2) from 1913 to 1922, when the legislation was debated and repeatedly voted down in congressional committees; and (3) from 1922 to 1934, when the legislation was redrafted and eventually passed into law. During these phases, those who supported the Act were continually called upon to explain the purpose of procedural reform. Their frequent statements about how the rules should not create tactical, biased, or complex/costly effects demonstrate that access was a driving purpose behind procedural reform.
A Movement Becomes Legislation
From 1896 until 1913, the idea of procedural reform evolved from an organized movement into concrete legislation. The American Bar Association (ABA) was the first organization to criticize the existing procedural regime, and thus, it is regarded as the institution that commenced the rulemaking reform movement. 2 In 1896, the ABA's Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law complained about the Conformity Act of 1872.22 Under that Act, federal courts applied the procedural law of the state in which they sat. 23 Lawyers argued that this led to great confusion; inter-jurisdictional lawyers had to account for multiple procedural rules, and often, the particular rules were not apparent, leaving lawyers to consult with individual clerks of court for each legal action. 24 In its report, the ABA committee argued that the existing system created bias and complexity. First, the committee complained that the lack of uniformity was unfair. 26 Well-resourced litigants could easily overcome the inconvenience of different rules, while less-resourced litigants were effectively excluded from court if they could not reconcile the variant rules. 27 Second, the ABA committee argued 23. The ABA Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law undertook a study and found that "the methods of practice [applied in the then-forty-five states] are exceedingly difficult of classification, and while they fall under the heads 'common law practice,' 'code procedure,' and 'practice acts,' it is not always easy to say under what division the procedure in a particular State is to be classed." Id. at 414. See also id at 424-32, for a summary of the procedure employed in the forty-three states the committee studied.
24. Id. at 420 (" [A] side from the few practitioners who make a specialty of practice in the Federal courts, the clerk of the court must be consulted upon all questions of practice, and attorneys are compelled to rely upon his courtesy for information as to even the most simple matters of procedure.").
25. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1041-42. 26. Id. at 1042. 27. See Fiero, supra note 22, at 420 ("With the mixed condition of affairs where practice is regulated by Federal statute, by rules of the Federal court, by the statute and rules of the court where the venue is laid, or possibly by the Chancery practice, modified by statute and rules, a lawyer practicing in the Federal courts, even in his own state, feels no more certainty as to the proper procedure than if he were before a tribunal of a foreign country."). 
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that under the Conformity Act, the procedural rules were too complex. As the committee explained, the goals of a procedural system were "simplicity and permanence. 2 8 Under a system of different rules, like the one in place in the late 1800s, these goals were less obtainable. 29 The "fixed and arbitrary" regulation in many states resulted in "inconvenience and injustice." 3 As a result, "[m]eritorious applications frequently fail[ed] by the barest technicality.' 3 The existing procedural rules did not "aid in the administration of justice," but only worked to "hamper... embarrass ... hinder ... and delay.. under the.. most minute questions of practice. 32 Thus, the committee lobbied for the adoption of a simple, uniform set of federal rules that would provide better access for all litigants....
The ABA report, while articulating these salient criticisms, did not convince the full ABA body or Congress to consider a uniform system of federal procedure, and enthusiasm for reform faded. 34 It was not until almost a decade later that interest in federal rulemaking was renewed. In 1906, Roscoe Pound delivered his speech about the "popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice." 3 5 That speech included a complaint about the absence of uniform federal rules of procedure, noting that the rules were arbitrary because as a result of such hyper-technical rules, "we still try the record, not the case., 36 Like the ABA, Pound argued that archaic procedural rules were preventing courts from reaching the merits of citizen disputes. 3 7 Following this speech, Pound became a critical proponent of the movement for procedural reform. In a series of articles published between 1909 and 1910, he argued that the Supreme Court's promulgation of such rules was the "most fundamental in a program of procedural reform., 38 REv. 1901 REv. , 1910 REv. -11 (1989 .
34. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1045 (noting that disagreement among members of the ABA about the necessity of uniform federal rules created a barrier to the reform movement and contributed to a lack of action by Congress).
35. (1910) . Yet, he also acknowledged that procedural reform was not a panacea-it would not get rid of all "dissatisfaction" with the justice system. Id. at 389.
38. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1048. Pound also joined the Committee of Fifteen (otherwise known as the far less catchy "A Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation") to study the need for procedural reform. Id. at 1046. It filed a report suggesting that the Supreme Court's admiralty and equity rulemaking power should be expanded to civil procedure. Id. system allowed for tactical use of the rules-a use that precluded reaching substantive claims. 39 He defended the reform by arguing that the rules would "help litigants" by "assist[ing] them in getting through the courts," 40 and rejected the current procedural system as an "instrument[] of stratagem for the bar and of logical excitation for the judiciary."' He wrote, "[R]ules of procedure should exist only to secure to all parties a fair opportunity to meet the case against them and a full opportunity to present their own case; and nothing should depend on or be obtainable through them except the securing of such an opportunity." 42 In response to these continued calls for reform, Thomas Shelton, the Chairman of the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, and Henry Clayton, the House Judiciary Committee Chair, drafted a rulemaking bill. This 1913 "enabling legislation" provided for the Supreme Court to make uniform rules of procedure. 43 Shelton was confident that the bill would pass, but it did not." In a later defense of this legislation, Clayton argued that "it is not to be doubted that such [procedural] rules will make more certain and speedy the vindication of rights and, as a corollary, the condemnation of wrongs." ' 45 Both Clayton's assertion and his bill would be debated over the decade that followed.
A Decade of Debate
Draft enabling legislation remained under committee review for the next ten years. During that time, a number of committee hearings were held to discuss the wisdom of reform. 46 In addition, proponents of the proposed legislation continued 39. Pound wrote, "But the controlling reason for a systematic and scientific adjective law must be to insure precision, uniformity and certainty in the judicial application of substantive law." Pound, supra note 37, at 388. 40. Id. at 400. 41. Id. 42. Id. at 402. To this principle, Pound added, "It should be for the court, in its discretion, not the parties, to vindicate rules of procedure intended solely to provide for the orderly dispatch of business, saving of public time, and maintenance of the dignity of tribunals; and such discretion should be reviewable only for abuse." Id. In later related articles Pound noted, "Thus, after a period of rigidity in practice, in which substance has been sacrificed to form and end has been subordinated to means, we are evidently about to enter upon a period of liberality in which the substance shall prevail and the machinery ofjustice shall be restrained by and made strictly to serve the end for which it exists." Roscoe Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN BAG 438, 438 (1910 I do know that the United States in its judicial procedure is many decades behind every other civilized government in the world; and I say that it is an immediate and imperative call upon us to rectify that, because the speediness ofjustice, the inexpensiveness of justice, the ready access of justice, is the greater part of justice itself. 47 In public and professional discourse, supporters like Senator Elihu Root also articulated the importance of procedural reform by arguing that the Civil Rules should not be needlessly complex. He argued, "Procedure ought to be based upon the common intelligence of the farmer, and the merchant, and the laborer .... There is no reason why a plain, honest man should not be permitted to go into court and tell his story and have the judge before whom he comes permitted to do justice in that particular case... "48 According to Root, this could be achieved with "plain and adequate [procedural] provisions." 4 9 Henry Clayton expanded on this sentiment by focusing on the complex/costly effect of the current procedural system. In a 1921 speech to the State Bar Association of California at Riverside, he explained that justice should be "as free as the air" and that "[i]t is the duty of the state.. .to keep the courts of the country open at all times to the poorest in the land that rights may be asserted and enforced with the least practicable delay and cost." 5 Clayton did not distinguish between defendants and plaintiffs on this point. He stated that a citizen with a just claim should be "entitled to redress for wrongs done him.. .without unreasonable delay" while a citizen with "an unjust claim asserted against. If you have to be rich to get justice, because of the cost of the very process itself, then there is no justice at all. So I say there is another direction in which we ought to be very quick to see the signs of the times and to help those who need to be helped." Id. at 2-3. In this unusual instance, the reform proponent positively invoked access in connection with speedy delivery of justice as a goal. This quote exemplifies how supporters used now-familiar terms like speedy and inexpensive to communicate variant meanings. In this case, the term is in proximity to access, making the interpretive principle easier to draw out. But, as I argue in this section, even when not expressly stated, access was a guiding principle of rulemaking reform.
48 necessary." 5 By eliminating the cost and complexity of the existing system, Clayton believed that access to the justice system would be universal, not necessarily skewed toward one party or another.
In the midst of this public discussion, the critical debates over the fate of enabling legislation continued in committee hearings. 52 As legislators, ABA members, and commentators continued to speak publicly for procedural reform, the chief critic of procedural reform, Senator Thomas J. Walsh, articulated his counterargument on the committee floor. In 1915, Senator Walsh and ABA Committee Chairman Shelton had their first public debate about the bill, but the relation of tactics, bias, and complexity to access was not explicitly discussed. Instead, they argued about the propriety of delegating rulemaking responsibility to the judiciary and about the impact that the uniform federal rules would have on home-state lawyers. 53 Ultimately, Walsh's message resonated with legislators, and the rulemaking reform legislation remained under committee review. 54 Thus, this period did not end with reform, but with a call by then-Chief Justice Taft to take further action on the bill." He spoke at a 1922 Annual ABA Meeting, and like other supporters, Taft elevated access by arguing for the elimination of procedural complexity. He argued,
[T]he plan is to make the system so simple that it needs no special knowledge to master it. It is for the plaintiff to write a letter to the court and state his case, and if he has not amplified it enough to make the case, to give him the opportunity in the course of the proceedings to put in the facts which are lacking More specifically, he argued for a statute to merge law and equity, and he proposed that the judiciary create its own rules of court. Id. Taft knew that his proposal would be met with great resistance in part because it expanded the judiciary's power. Id. at 607. He noted that his proposal would "involve some increase in the power of the Judges of the Courts" and that the proposal would "be opposed solely on this ground." Id. Thus, to achieve this legislation, he suggested an interbranch solution that showed great sensitivity to ongoing concerns about the judiciary's legitimacy. Id. He proposed a commission appointed by the President. Id This commission, comprised of two Supreme Court justices, two circuit judges, two district judges and three lawyers, would draft the necessary legislation and provide for another commission to create the necessary procedural rules. Id Taft even proposed that these "rules" be presented to Congress, who could act on them within a six-month period or not act and they would become law. 
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Taft had observed the success of such rules in England. 57 That system allowed for great flexibility in bringing cases to court, and was motivated in part by a desire to ease accessibility. 58 Taft quoted English jurist Albert Venn Dicey who praised the procedural changes in England for giving "reality to the legal rights of individuals." 59 Taft called for the judiciary to draft like procedural rules in order to "simplify procedure and speed justice in our federal courts." 6
A Revised Rules Enabling Act and Its Serendipitous Adoption
Heavily persuaded by Taft's speech, Senator Albert B. Cummins, who was originally on Senator Walsh's side, began to work with Shelton to revise the rulemaking bill. 6 1 The redraft looked much like the eventual statute, providing among other things that "the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia.. .the practice and procedure in actions at law." 62 The statute gave the Court authority to make its own rules of court, and to meet an ongoing concern about granting rulemaking power to the judiciary; it expressly prohibited the Court from prescribing substantive law. 63 Yet, even when a prohibition on substantive rulemaking was delineated, the bill did not go to a vote.' Senator Walsh best articulated the ongoing opposition to the bill in his speech to the Oregon Bar Association in 1926.65 He first questioned the value of uniformity by downplaying bias in the rules and arguing that the homestate lawyer would be burdened with learning two systems instead of one. 66 He also 66. Id. at 2-3. He stated that a uniform system of procedural rules: would impose an exceedingly heavy burden upon any lawyer, even on the young practitioner whose ideas are not fixed and whose mind is active, but to those of more advanced age, who do not learn the new methods so quickly, who are wedded to the systems in which they were bred, it would be an almost intolerable burden. 
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questioned whether the proposed system would eliminate complexity. He alleged that similar systems, like David Dudley Field's New York Code, had largely failed and created confusion. 6 7 Finally, he argued that the Constitution prohibited delegation of this rulemaking power. 68 Once again, Walsh's criticisms proved effective. By 1930, the Judiciary Committee had repeatedly failed to vote the bill out of committee and, the original proponents of the legislation, the ABA, began to retreat. 69 In 1933, the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure lapsed, and the final death knell sounded when President Roosevelt appointed Senator Walsh as his Attorney General. 7 " It was clear that Attorney General Walsh was not going to push for a uniform set of procedural rules.
However, as both misfortune and luck would have it, Walsh passed away shortly after his appointment. 7 ' President Roosevelt appointed Homer Cummings to the post, and Cummings immediately took up the issue of procedural reform. 72 In 1934, at an address to the New York County Lawyers' Association, he invoked access by saying that "[c]ourts exist to vindicate and enforce substantive rights" and that "[p]rocedure [was] merely the machinery designed to secure an orderly presentation of legal controversies." 73 To untangle the unnecessarily complex procedural "machinery," which had only "serve[d] to delay justice or entrap the unwary," Cummings explained that both he and President Roosevelt supported procedural reform. 7 4 Within three months of Cummings' suggestion to both the House and According to Pound, Walsh was really concerned about "depriv[ing].. .the local bars of business which now comes to them." Id.
67. Walsh, supra note 65, at 4-5, 7. Pound rejected this argument as well by asserting that "[e]very argument against a civil code is valid against the existing system." Pound, supra note 66, at 85.
68. Walsh, supra note 65, at 13. William G. Ross wrote: Proposals to permit the Supreme Court to promulgate such rules, subject to congressional approval, encountered opposition from some liberal critics of the federal judiciary who questioned the constitutionality of congressional delegation of rule-making powers to the courts, opposed additional centralization of power in the federal government, and feared that the new rules would be unduly rigid. WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1930-1941, at 236 (Herbert A. Johnson ed., Univ. of South Carolina Press 2007). Pound responded by first arguing that the Court had long made procedural rules in other areas such as "equity, in admiralty, in bankruptcy, and in copyright causes." Pound, supra note 66, at 86. Pound also rejected the constitutional argument. Id. He turned to the historical development of the English courts to argue that the "court may constitutionally have the power to regulate the practice in the causes it has the power to review, as was the doctrine at common law as between the courts at Westminster and the circuits." Id.
69. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1094. The ABA passed a resolution acknowledging the bill's stagnation and deciding against further intervention. Id. Interestingly, in early 1933, Congress passed legislation that enabled the Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules for criminal appeals. Ross, supra note 68, at 235. Yet, the willingness to confer this authority in the criminal context still did not translate into the civil one, presumably because the monetary stakes in civil litigation for lawyers and segments of the public were much higher than in the criminal context. 75 The Rules Enabling Act was born less than four months after Cummings took his post, but almost forty years after its origination. 76 As Henry Clayton explained in an earlier speech, the broad purpose of rulemaking reform was to give "every man" a fair shot at justice. 77 If one unpacks statements by Clayton and other key proponents of the Act, it is my contention that a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" procedural system encapsulated more than systemic efficiencies. Quite apart from efficiency, these men also imagined a sort of aspirational accessibility for all individuals-in this most ambitious sense, the doors to justice would be wide open. 7 8 The calls to remove archaic barriers to substantive claims, eliminate bias in rule application, and reduce tactical use of the rules demonstrate that these men considered access to be a driving goal of procedural reform. To be sure, a procedural system that prioritized justice and efficiency would engender many goods, but one of the essential goods was access to the resolution of legal claims. Following the passage of the Act, the question then became how the rules themselves could best achieve these goals.
B. The Civil Rules: From the Original Rules to Present
After the Enabling Act passed, the Supreme Court was responsible for drafting and amending a unified set of procedural rules. The following section provides a summary of the rules and rulemaking process as they evolved over time. Broadly speaking, the account is divided up into three periods: (1) from 1934 to 1956, when the rules were drafted and only modestly amended; (2) from 1956 to 1983, when the civil rulemaking process was restructured; and (3) from 1983 to the present, when the civil rulemaking process and civil litigation endured greater scrutiny.
75. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1096-97. 76. The 1934 Act provided as follows:
Sec. 1.
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect 6 months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Sec. 2. The Court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That in such union ofrules the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such session. 78 CONG. REC. 9362 (1934) . The only change to the 1923 version of the Act was the addition of the word "civil" in the first sentence of Section 2. 
The Rules Become a Reality
The Rules Enabling Act authorized the Supreme Court to create procedural rules for the federal courts. 7 9 When the Act passed, no one expected the Supreme Court itself to draft and promulgate the rules. 8° Guided by that perception, the Court appointed a committee of "experts," chaired by former Attorney General William D. Mitchell, to craft the rules. 8 These "highly competent" committee members included government lawyers, academics, and firm lawyers, but did not include members of the judiciary. 2 Besides authorizing general rulemaking authority, the Act was scant on details. It did not require a particular rulemaking process nor did it state what the new procedural rules should do. Perhaps only Senator Walsh appreciated the difficulty presented by this lack of detail, stating before his death that "[t]he task to be set the Supreme Court is not only appalling in its magnitude..., it is [] well-nigh impossible However, there was at least one outlier. Henry Clayton thought that the Court could draft the rules on its own. Clayton, supra note 77, at 13. Clayton stated that providing for a "commission to be composed of lawyers and judges to formulate these rules" was "not necessary." Id. Thus, the basic tenets of the current rulemaking process reflect a view that technical rulemaking power is properly vested in bureaucratic entities. Even then, however, the Court and Committee members understood that vesting this power in an unelected branch of government could be controversial. Carrington, supra note 63, at 301-02 (explaining that "[t]he Rules Enabling Act was avowedly antidemocratic in the sense that it withdrew procedural law-making from the political arena and made it the activity of professional technicians"). 83 Because of the Act's silence, at the Committee's first meeting, the members were occupied with the Act's scope and the technical details of the rulemaking process. For example, they discussed whether, under the Act, they were permitted to draft rules of evidence, appellate procedure, or bankruptcy rules." They also debated how to structure the rulemaking process. 85 The Committee decided to adopt the American Law Institute's model for drafting the rules, which meant the Reporter would draft and circulate rules to the Committee for review. 86 In addition, sensitive to how the Bench and Bar would receive the rules, the members agreed to send the proposed rules to certainjudges and lawyers before forwarding them to the Supreme Court. 7 In this one meeting, the Committee determined the fundamentals of a rulemaking structure that would endure for the next eighty years.
When it came to the content of the rules, the members were not as preoccupied with the Enabling Act's silence. The members brought their own strong opinions about the rules' substance. And, they were attentive to the same concerns that animated the passage of the Act, including what effects the rules should avoid to ensure access. First, the Committee was adamant about uniformity of the rules. A debate about rule uniformity spans sixteen pages of the initial minutes, ending with a resolution that the rules would be constant in each and every district court. 88 In addition, the now-familiar substance of the rules showed the rulemakers' concern with access. Under the leadership of Clark, the Committee drafted flexible pleading, liberal joinder, and broad discovery rules. 8 9 By introducing this flexibility, 83. Burbank, supra note 6, at 1088-89; see also Walsh, supra note 65, at 9 ("[T]he magnitude of the task thus to be imposed upon the Supreme Court of the United States is something I am perfectly certain has not even been conceived of by those who seek to institute this reform."). Walsh expressed that the Supreme Court was too busy to draft the rules, so it "would be obliged to farm it out to some kind of a commission who would be charged with the duty of doing this great work." Id. He also noted that "[n]o provision is made for the creation of such a commission in the bill or for the paying of the commissioners who would do the work or even for the payment of the necessary clerk hire in order that it might be carried on." Id.
84. See MINUTES OF ADVISORY RULES COMMITTEE, supra note 80, at 111-28, 176-78. Ultimately, the Committee adopted a resolution that "it is the sense of this Committee that the writing of a code of evidence is not included within the general scope of the statute." Id. at 126-27. At the behest of Clark, this was their "tentative" sense, leaving open the option of drafting a code of evidence at a later date. Id. at 127. The Committee did not disagree as much about drafting rules of appellate and bankruptcy procedure. Id. at 125-52, 176-78. The Committee agreed to draft rules about the method of appeal at the district court level, leaving any appellate court procedure to Congress. Id. at 149. Finally, the Committee also debated whether, in light of the existing venue statute, it could draft rules adapting or incorporating venue. Id. at 159-63.
85. See supra note 76. Under the statute, the rules had to be reported to Congress at the beginning of its session and would take effect after that session closed, but no other process was required. Id. 90 In addition, Clark reiterated that uniform procedural rules that did not bias any group of litigants were necessary. As he later wrote, "Regular procedure is necessary to secure equal treatment for all; it is necessary, too, for the quite important factor of the appearance of equal treatment of all." 9 ' The "settled habits" set out in the new procedural rules were critical to this proper "process of adjudication," where litigants were able to reach the merits of their claims without unnecessary procedural barriers. 92 With these goals in mind, the Committee met several times over a two-year period to create the rules. 93 The rules were readily approved by the Supreme Court in December 1937, forwarded on to the Attorney General, and presented to Congress at the beginning of its 1938 session. 94 The rules became law at the end of the congressional session on September 16, 1938. 9 " Following all of the activity that went into creating this seminal 1938 package of rules, the Committee was far less active. The Supreme Court officially designated the Committee as a continuing body on January 5, 1942, and the Committee presented some technical amendments over the next several years, but did not modify the original substance of the rules.
See MINUTES OF ADVISORY RULES

96
By the end of this period, the Committee operated more or less in quiet isolation. 9 7 2. Rulemaking: A Minor Crisis and Restructuring This relative calm for the rulemaking committee did not last for long. By the early 1950s, there was a perception that the Supreme Court was simply "rubber stamping," and not fully considering, the work of the Committee. 9 s The Committee responded by suggesting a number of process reform proposals to the Supreme Congress codified this agreement, 1 0 7 but the statute remained silent as to a rulemaking process and mandate. In response, the Judicial Conference formed a different committee structure: a Standing Committee with oversight over five advisory committees (one each for admiralty, bankruptcy, appellate, civil, and criminal rules)." 8 The Conference also instructed all of its committees "to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."' 9 Just, speedy, and inexpensive continued to be the basic directive, but the Conference did not explain how to interpret these terms. These changes to the committee structure were intended to address concerns about the process, but they did not put a stop to that criticism. "' Instead, this period closed with a key misstep in rulemaking history. In 1972, the Evidence Rules Committee"' proposed controversial rules that were ultimately rewritten by Congress." 2 The rules were criticized for being unresponsive to concerns about the scope of important societal interests like spousal privilege." 3 Most commentators cite this so-called "evidence debacle" as the beginning of the end for unadulterated rulemaking independence."
4 At the very least, the gaffe over the Rules of Evidence brought much greater scrutiny to the rulemaking process.
Crisis for Civil Litigation and Civil Rulemaking
Following the problems with the Evidence Rules, commentators and legislators began to take aim at the entire rulemaking operation by challenging how the process worked." 5 In an attempt to head off further criticism of its activities, the Standing 109. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 108. The Bench and Bar responded positively to these changes. Judge Maris, a Senior Third Circuit Judge wrote the following in an ABA article summarizing the new process:
With such backing from the Chief Justice of the United States and with the cooperation of the Bench and Bar the program of the Judicial Conference for the improvement of federal procedure will be effective and the Supreme Court will be afforded the assistance which it needs in order to enable it to keep the federal rules of procedure always in such form as to promote, in the light of the best current thought and practice, simplicity, fairness and thejust, economical and prompt determination of litigation in the federal courts. 111. I will refer to the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence as the "Evidence Committee." 112. In 1965, the Judicial Conference created the Evidence Committee to draft the first-ever Federal Rules of Evidence. 1995 Self-Study, supra note 97, at 686. The Admiralty Rules were merged into the Federal Rules of Civil Rules in 1966; thus, there were still only five advisory committees after the Evidence Rules Committee was created. McCabe, supra note 2, at 1659. Up to that time, the "rules" ofevidence were spread between common law and some codified procedural rules. 20 123 Congress required each district court to create a plan to reduce cost and delay. While the CJRA did not directly affect the rulemaking process, it deviated from the principle of uniformity by allowing for district courts to pass different rules.' 24 To this day, Congress and commentators continue to express unease about civil rulemaking. "Crisis" rhetoric is often employed to describe its state of being. 25 122. See Burbank, supra note 7, at 845. Professor Burbank criticized the Rule 26 amendments by arguing they passed with "little relevant empirical evidence, and, indeed, the Committee repeatedly rejected pleas to stay its hand pending the evaluation of experience under the rules." 1d; see also Stempel, supra note 105, at 636. Professor Stempel wrote in disapproving of the 2000 discovery amendments that
[a]t the metaphorical end of the day, the proposal to limit discovery scope is explained less by the cerebral power of an idea whose time has come and more by the political structure of the rulemaking process and the socio-political structure of the elite bar and the current federal bench, particularly 
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cause of the discomfort with civil rulemaking is complex. It is driven by concerns that are both intellectual-institutional pressures and politics-and mundane-personality conflicts and turf wars. For this article I focus on one source of disquiet regarding the Civil Rules and the rulemaking process: the state of civil litigation. Starting in the 1970s, a so-called "litigation explosion" captured the attention of lawyers and lay people alike.' 26 A negative view of litigation-one that relied heavily on frivolous lawsuits burying the justice system and providing a windfall to undeserving litigants-began to take hold.' 27 Since then, the debate over frivolous litigation has permeated the discussion of civil litigation in the media, on the legislative floor, and in academia. 2 Moreover, high-profile cases and damage awards' 29 and overburdenedjudicial dockets 3 ' have only compounded the argument that the civil justice system is in need of repair. There is rich academic literature on both sides,' 3 ' and I do not rehearse the debate here. Rather, I call attention to this movement in civil litigation as the impetus for the diminution of access in civil rulemaking.
The state of civil litigation has led to a call for systemic efficiency, and multiple institutions have heeded that call.' 32 As the counterweight to efficiency, access to the negative rhetoric used to explain the state of civil rulemaking, including statements of its being "under siege" and in its "death throes"). 129. The McDonalds hot coffee spill litigation is the emblematic high-profile case. The media portrayed this case as an example of the ridiculous claims individuals could be compensated for in court. See Miller, supra note 9, at 987-88 & n. 15 (noting that the plaintiff had a valid claim because the coffee was "superheated," and because the victim sustained serious bums that required substantial hospitalization).
130. The court system is burdened, but this is not just the result of an increase in civil litigation, which, as noted, is debatable when compared to earlier civil filing trends. 132. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 996 ("[l]t seems likely that the availability of full adjudication has declined during the past twenty years. The total number of cases continues to increase as a function of population growth, social complexity, changes in substantive law, litigiousness and the like. However, today's disputant considering litigation to assert a claim seems likely to find the option less attractive than was the case in the 1970s. 
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the justice system is deemphasized. Civil rulemaking, subject to these same political, institutional, and societal pressures, is not immune to this movement. Below, I offer examples of how recent Civil Rules have diminished access. These examples are not exhaustive, nor do they represent an argument that the rulemakers affirmatively moved to restrict litigant access. To the contrary, these examples show how civil rulemaking is caught up in a larger movement that aims to restrain litigation and demonstrate how, as a consequence, access has faded as a guiding principle.
The first example is the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. Rule 11 had always authorized sanctions for filing frivolous claims, but this amendment required such sanctions.' This change to the rules was lauded as one necessary tool to fix the litigation explosion. 13 Yet, the rule produced at least one unintended consequence-satellite litigation over the merits of Rule 11 motions--cutting against the idea that the rules should not engender unnecessary complexity or reward tactical behavior.' In addition, the rule resulted in a biased application to litigants. Studies of Rule 11 's impact show that plaintiffs were sanctioned more often than defendants, and that even within plaintiffs as a group, particular
Although the growth of alternatives to ADR may provide an adequate substitute for trial, obtaining trial itself is a more difficult and cumbersome process."). The summary I provide oversimplifies the contributing factors to this diminished access. I do so to make a point about the role of civil rulemaking in restoring access-the idea that, to the extent we sacrifice access, we should do so thoughtfully. I do not make the argument in order to assert that there is a right side and wrong side to how access is treated within our justice system. I take respite in this complexity by relying on Professor Stephen Yeazell's un-binary view of the civil justice system. See Stephen C. Yeazell Although we consciously chose the individual legal changes, we have not entirely comprehended their combined effect. As a consequence, we sometimes debate particular features-for example, styles ofjudging, the virtues and vices of discovery, abuses of the legal system, alternatives to litigation, and various docket-speeding local experiments-without acknowledging their links to the system as a whole. We need a better sense of these connections and a more comprehensive sense of how process functions as a system.
Id.
133. Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171,172 (1994). The rule was amended to remove the subjective standard of whether the filing was made in good faith and replace it with an objective standard requiring sanctions if the filing was not reasonably investigated to assure it was "well grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law." See WALTER R. MANSFIELD 221,228 (1997) [hereinafter Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change]. A timing lapse allowed the rules to become effective, however, because the Senate bill rejecting the rules did not come to the floor in time. Id. at 228. See generally Tobias, supra note 133 (discussing in depth the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11). It could be argued that Congress's attempt to override Rule II demonstrates that the system is attuned to access concerns. While it is true that Congress almost prevented the rule from being adopted, the rule ultimately passed. Congress was unable to stop the rule from passing for some of the reasons that I outline in Part M.A. In response to that structural defect, I argue for Congress to have a greater presence in the ongoing process so that it has less tendency to step in at inopportune times or to miss a chance to stop a faulty rule. See infra plaintiffs-such as those bringing civil rights claims-were sanctioned more often than plaintiffs bringing other types of substantive claims.' 36 Thus, the rule created, rather than precluded, tactical maneuvering, bias, and complexity/cost.' 3 7 Or, put another way, an efficiency response to the litigation-explosion critique took precedence over access.
Discovery rule amendments have similarly been designed to curb the litigation explosion. Discovery rules were originally viewed as a key component of the Civil Rules. 38 The rules give litigants insight into information not otherwise in their control, and thus, increase the potential for reaching the merits of their case.' 39 Yet, beginning in the 1960s, commentators began to articulate concerns about "discovery abuse."' 40 The Committee responded to this charge by implementing a string of discovery amendments meant to stifle the abuse.
For example, in 1993, the Committee attempted to "simplify" discovery by requiring automatic disclosure of items relevant to matters "alleged with particularity" in the pleadings. 4 ' This change was incredibly controversial. 137. Over a decade later, the Committee went back to the drawing board and amended the rule to make the sanctions discretionary and to provide litigants with a safe harbor. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 arguably lessened these consequences, but some commentators argue that the rule amendment continues to chill some litigation. Tobias, supra note 134, at 897 ("Nevertheless, an incorrect balance was struck because the proposed Rule will insufficiently ameliorate the burdens for parties and attorneys, particularly poorer ones."); Tobias, supra note 135, at 192; see also Stempel, supra note 12, at 994 ("[B]oth the 1983 Amendment and the 1993 Amendment represent increased procedural hurdles and risk for litigants, resulting in a net shrinkage of access to courts."). An argument can be made that access concerns led the Committee to revise the 1983 amendment. Yet, the Committee was largely driven to change the rule because studies determined that the rule was not efficacious in decreasing frivolous suits; it was less convinced when it came to access concerns. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 137 F.R.D. 53, 65 (June 13, 1991). The Committee considered the following in revising Rule 11:
(1) Rule 11, in conjunction with other rules, has tended to impact plaintiffs more frequently and severely than defendants; (2) it occasionally has created problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal contentions or which needs discovery from other persons to determine if the party's belief about the facts can be supported with evidence; (3) it has too rarely been enforced through nonmonetary sanctions, with cost-shifting having become the normative sanction; (4) it provides little incentive, and perhaps a disincentive, for a party to abandon positions after determining they are no longer supportable in fact or law; and (5) it sometimes has produced unfortunate conflicts between attorney and client, and exacerbated contentious behavior between counsel. Id. at 64-65. The first consideration augments access, yet the remaining concerns are more systemic. As to chilling litigation, the second consideration, the Committee notes that this was only an "occasional" problem and not a primary concern.
138. See Subrin, supra note 20, at 710-29. 139. Sunderland stated, "Only by a preliminary proceeding in which each party may call upon the other to submit himselfand his witnesses to interrogation under oath, can the true nature of the controversy be satisfactorily ascertained." 
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Plaintiffs worried that defendants would abuse the rule because the mandatory discovery requirement was triggered by specific facts and did not rely on a notice pleading standard. 4 2 They complained that defendants could avoid producing material evidence by asserting the documents did not relate to a matter pled with particularity.' 43 Defendants worried about how to determine what should be disclosed under the rule and what that determination would cost.'" Largely because no one was happy with this rule, the Committee allowed for districts to opt out of it. " ' 4 5 This move ran afoul of uniformity principles and created bias in how the rule was applied to plaintiffs and defendants alike. In other words, a defendant in one district court could be subject to a different rule than a similarly situated defendant in a neighboring district court.' 46 Moreover, some commentators asserted that the rule amendments created an opportunity for gamesmanship because defendants could refuse to produce meaningful discovery by claiming that the plaintiff had not pled an issue with sufficient particularity. ' 47 This violated the principle that the rules not reward tactical behavior.' 4 8
These rules exemplify how access, as understood by the proponents of the Rules Enabling Act, has been deemphasized in the civil rulemaking process. It is worth noting, however, that the civil rulemaking body is not the only institution trying to control litigation in this fashion. Rather, a number of institutions are doing so.
In recent decades, Congress has shown a greater willingness to engage in procedural reform as a way to thwart what it views as wasteful litigation. One example is the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.' 49 Among other things, the Act required heightened pleading standards for plaintiffs in securities litigation actions, and it limited discovery until a motion to dismiss was decided by the court. 5 ' A more recent example of congressional intervention is the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act, which moved jurisdiction for most class actions from state to federal court.' 5 ' These legislative acts were meant to curb so-called frivolous 146. The rule was amended in 2000 to eliminate the opt-in provision, but it was also arguably made even more restrictive by limiting the scope of the mandatory disclosure to items related to claims or defenses (not to "relevant subject matter"). Stempel, supra note 105, at 549-52. For more on the impact of this amendment, see id 147. Hench, supra note 142, at 211-14. 148. See generally Hench, supra note 142. The irony ofthis is that the rule was originally conceived, in part, to end the kind of gamesmanship that its proponents believed was prevalent under the existing discovery system. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 820. litigation, but many commentators believe that they also limit meritorious litigation. In other words, even legitimate litigants may be stifled from filing or reaching the merits of their claims because of the barriers this legislation erects.1
52
The Supreme Court has similarly reacted to the litigation explosion. The best demonstration of this response is the so-called trilogy of cases, where in one year, the Court decided three crucial cases about summary judgment.' 53 While the academic discourse about summary judgment is intensely divided, a number of scholars have questioned whether summary judgment has in fact decreased frivolous litigation.' 54 Moreover, many scholars have argued that there is a defendant bias in summary judgment and that increased summary judgment filings have denied many litigants the opportunity to reach the merits of their claims.' 153. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (holding that "the [initial] burden [of production] on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case"); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (holding that when "ruling on a motion for summaryjudgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden"); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (limiting the inferences to be drawn in a summary judgment motion to those called for by the underlying substantive law).
154. 155. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1071 ("Overly enthusiastic use ofsummaryjudgment means that trialworthy cases will be terminated pretrial on motion papers, possibly compromising the litigants' constitutional rights to a day in court and jury trial. That is a risk the trilogy has created."). Some scholars have even argued that summary judgment is unconstitutional because it denies a litigant her right to trial. See Suja A. Thomas 
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Commentators similarly worry about how the Court's recent decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. lqbal' 56 will affect litigants. Some argue that, as a result of these cases, the Court is moving toward a heightened pleading regime.' The ultimate impact of Twombly and Iqbal is being debated in both the courts and in academic literature.' 58 Yet, for the Court to even reconsider the notice pleading standard repeatedly upheld in Conley' 59 and its progeny is disturbing to many commentators and signals an attenuation of access as a guiding principle of our civil litigation system.
A final institutional actor is the organized bar group. From the American Law Institute to the American Association for Justice 6 ' to the ABA, these groups are heavily involved in shaping civil litigation. And, much of their organized work impacts how Congress and the Supreme Court approach procedural rules.' 6 ' Depending on the groups' ideological bent, they lobby for different reforms. Yet, in recent decades, some have argued that the defense-side bar associations have exerted a greater influence, thereby diminishing access for some litigants.' 6 2
Together, these institutions have worked to curb what is viewed as inefficient litigation, and as a consequence, access has diminished. With respect to civil rulemaking, Rules 11 and 26 demonstrate that rulemakers have been less attentive to precluding the tactical, biased, and complex/costly effects of procedures. To be sure, rulemakers are generally sensitive to access concerns. Yet, as I argue in the next Part, the Committee members' weighted litigation experience and the lack of an explicit access mandate has allowed access to be overshadowed by persistent litigation-explosion concerns. In the next Part, I turn from a historical discussion of that the grant rate only increased for employment discrimination cases). All of these studies only sample particular districts; thus, it is difficult to determine the overall effect that the changes to summaryjudgment practice have had on litigants.
156. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544,555 (2007) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level"); lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 Ct. , 1949 Ct. (2009 (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough "factual content" to allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged").
157. Spencer, supra note 11, at 433. One study conducted by a student has found that dismissals in civil rights litigation have increased by 11 percent. 45-46 (1957) (noting that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief'). But see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 ("retiring" this oft-quoted Conley language); lqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953 (confirming that Twombly applies to all "civil actions").
160. This group was formerly known as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. 161. These groups have an impact on the substantive law by lobbying Congress for particular statutes. They also influence our understanding of the law by drafting restatements of the law (the American Law Institute) and by helping to develop code systems like the Uniform Commercial Code.
162. See Stempel, supra note 105, at 623-34 (discussing the impact of the ABA and the American College of Trial Lawyers on discovery reform). 
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access to an examination of how structural changes to the rulemaking process can augment access going forward.
III. RECOVERING ACCESS
The decline of what I define as access in civil litigation can be addressed in part by civil rulemaking, but only if structural changes to the process are made. In the previous Parts, I demonstrated that civil rulemaking should endeavor to account for access when crafting the rules. This conception of the Civil Rules, one that elevates access, is supported by the historical insight into proponents' views of the Rules Enabling Act and rulemaking process. By recovering a historical account of access that maps onto the access meaning that I propose and by reviewing the state of current civil litigation and its impact on the Civil Rules, I conclude that access has been diminished. In this Part, I examine how the civil rulemaking process can be better structured to facilitate the consideration of access as a co-equal principle. Before engaging in that discussion, I provide a brief survey of the academic discourse about the structure of the rulemaking process.
A. Federal Civil Rulemaking Options: The Academic Response
Commentators defend the current court-based rulemaking structure by doing one or both of the following: (1) rejecting a legislative model of rulemaking and/or (2) suggesting modifications to the existing court-based structure that will augment the body's legitimacy.' 6 3 Following this overview, I argue that these structural suggestions, while orthogonal to efficacy, are not constitutive of efficacy. In other words, some of the structural proposals may be required on legitimacy grounds, but they do not necessarily address the adequacy of the rules themselves." 6 1. Structural Options Most commentators accept that the Supreme Court should delegate its rulemaking responsibilities. As the entity named in the Act, the Supreme Court is the most obvious body to handle rulemaking from a statutory perspective.1 65 Yet, as already noted, no one expected the Court itself to draft the rules.
16 6 How can the 163. There are scholars who challenge the constitutionality of court-based rulemaking. See sources cited supra note 6. In this section, I discuss only those scholars that accept the delegation of procedural rulemaking as constitutional and comment on the structure of that process.
164. See discussion infia Part IH.B (regarding interrelated concerns about the legitimacy of the process and the adequacy/efficacy of the rules).
165. It is also the most visible body in the judicial branch. Members of the Supreme Court are vetted by Congress. That process is fairly well publicized, and unlike the appointment of circuit and district court judges, Supreme Court appointees are subject to rigorous public exposure and debate. Moreover, academics and practitioners, with the exception of a few star members of these groups (i.e., academic Alan Dershowitz and practitioner Mark Geragos), are not subject to that kind of public and political scrutiny. The question that scholars wrestle with is how court-based rulemaking is better than legislative rulemaking. Professor Robert Bone is at the forefront of this argument. He asserts that legitimacy in rulemaking "does not derive from public participation or political accountability, but instead from a model of principled deliberation akin to common law reasoning." 6 ' According to Bone, the process does not have to be representative or public; it must be deliberative.' 69 He concedes that public input can be useful when properly regulated and used, so the Committee should seek outside opinions of the proposed rules. 7 ' But, this does not mean that the process has to be completely open to "broad-based participation.''.
Bone and others concede that limited public participation in rulemaking is beneficial, but that a risk of such participation is a Committee that functions like Congress.' 72 The primary concern is that interest-group politics would not produce good rules.' 7 3 Bone notes that in 1983 the process server lobby almost blocked a reasonable change to Rule 4 that would have, among other things, required service by certified or registered mail and not necessarily by an official process server.' 74 In that instance, the lobby influenced Congress, which used its authority to delay the rule change and require an official process server to carry out the task.
175
Considering the impact of a relatively small interest group with respect to an otherwise reasonable rule change, one can imagine how challenging the process would become if it were baldly representative. 76 167. Moreover, in thinking of judicial review, it would be odd for the Court to review its own originally drafted rules and amendments. But, perhaps this discomfort calls into question the concept of the Court making its own procedural rules, whether directly or by proxy. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 8 (Ohio State University Press 1977). Judge Weinstein notes that "[o]ne matter of some concern [is] the ability of any court to remain impartial in its consideration of a rule when an attack was made upon the rule's wisdom or constitutionality, since the same body that promulgated the rule was passing upon it." Id.
168. Bone, supra note 5, at 890. 169. Id. at 908-09. 170. Id. at 950. 171. Id. As will be discussed later, Bone believes that the Committee composition and mandate should be modified; that the "efficacy of the institutional design" will lend much more to the legitimacy of the institution than any additional "degree of public accountability." Id.
172. Id. at 909; Burbank, supra note 7, at 849. 173. See Burbank, supra note 7, at 849-50 ("[T]he more we fashion the rulemaking process in Congress' image, the more Congress will be tempted to second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it."); Bone, supra note 5, at 923 ("Because of.. .collective action problems,...legislative rulemaking is likely to be plagued by inefficient logrolling."); Mullenix, supra note 7, at 801 ("[P]oliticiz[ing] the rulemaking process [will lead the Advisory Committee to] create vacuous, ineffective rules that are the result of political compromise... [to] fail to effectuate any rule reform, becoming bogged down in endless stalemate, delay, and legislative paralysis.").
174. Bone, supra note 5, at 902-03. The amendment also allowed, with a few exceptions, process by any non-party adult.
175. Id. 176. Another example ofinterest-group politics affecting rulemaking occurred in 1988. In that case, Senator Inouye pushed through a revision to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that allowed a court to order mental examinations by licensed clinical psychologists (and not just psychiatrists or psychologists with medical degrees). Burbank, supra note 6, at 1165. The rule change smacked of nepotism because Senator lnouye's daughter-in-law was a licensed clinical psychologist. Id. Moreover, the rule reflected the broader dangers inherent in interest-group driven rules of procedure. As Burbank notes, the Rule 35 amendment is "an excellent example of the kind of legislation that turned the New York Field Code of 1848 into a monstrosity." Id. If every interest 
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Relatedly, a disparity in lobbying resources is a reason to reject legislative rulemaking. Litigants already suffer a great difference in resources pre-, during, and post-trial. This disparity would only be exacerbated if litigants with greater resources could unevenly impact rulemaking through lobbying efforts. Paul Carrington lauds what he calls the current "apolitical approach to matters of procedure" because it does not allow "groups.. .such as 'repeat players' and the organized bar [to] exercise disproportionate influence on the process" and protects the interests of the "disorganized (and hence powerless)."' 177 Thus, while a legislative model of federal court rulemaking has not been attempted, the general consensus is that such a body would be dysfunctional. 78 Consequently, one would expect commentators to agree that the existing committee system is optimal. However, there is no such consensus on that point. There is an acceptance of the delegated process writ large, but the devil is in the details. It is a struggle to structure a process that meets the vacillating complaints that commentators, the public, and Congress have about the rules produced by the Committee.
For example, up until the late 1980s the Committee functioned as a fairly isolated body.
17 9 When criticism of the Committee increased, Congress adopted the Justice Act to require greater transparency in the process. 8 1 Some, like Professor Stephen Yeazell, embrace these changes and argue that the public comment inquiry should be even more aggressive, with the committee actively seeking a "cross-section of the bar, specifically identifying those whose views might be adverse to the proposed rules."'' Others reject these changes as superficial, arguing that the effect is only to put a gloss on a process that is, by its nature, skewed in one ideological direction. 82 Thus, there is no agreement on what structure will achieve the best rules.
Ultimately, this conundrum about how the delegated body should function has led some to suggest solutions outside of the existing structure. Proposals include the creation of additional entities to regulate and/or participate in the rulemaking process, as well as clearer guidelines or steps designed by an outside body.
18 3 For group mobilized to lobby an elected rulemaking body, the rules could similarly grow in length and complexity. Or worse, the result could be complete rulemaking gridlock. 177. See Carrington, supra note 63, at 301-02. Of course, the current rulemaking process is not all that different in this respect from a legislative body. Recent changes to the process have pushed rulemaking towards a legislative model. As Burbank notes, the rulemaking process has "come to resemble the legislative process," which is "an overtly political process." Burbank, supra note 7, at 849. Thus, the view of the current process as "apolitical" maybe a bit naive. Nonetheless, the concern about the effect that resource disparities between plaintiffs and defendants would have in a representative rulemaking process has some salience.
178. On the other side of the spectrum, Bone calls for more judges." 1 As discussed above, he argues that the rulemaking process should be a deliberative one. To him, the best way to effectuate deliberation is to staff the Committee with individuals who are not subject to great outside influence. " [I] nsofar as outcome quality is concerned, the better response to public choice problems is to improve the deliberative process by controlling rulemaker incentives rather than accommodate competing interests. 202 To Bone, the best way to legitimize the deliberative process is to have judges-the optimal source of neutral arbiters-making the rules. In response to the criticism that this structure looks self-interested, Bone argues that any appearance of impropriety can be offset by thoroughly vetted and clearly explained rules. 20 3 Rather than attend to the occupation of the Committee members, Professor Jeffrey Stempel questions whether the Committee should have a particular ideological make-up. Stempel believes the Committee is ideologically skewed toward one interest. For judges, the concern is their own self-interest; they reserve power for themselves as opposed to making a determinative rule that will be consistently enforced. 2°4 For other members (and for some judges), the concern is that the members are predisposed to protecting their clients (or former clients)--namely, corporate defendants. 20 5 The Committee originally consisted of government service lawyers, who had less financial stake in the rules. 20 6 Moreover, even the corporate-law-firm lawyers on the Committee were considered "lawyer-statesmen," individuals whose careers were not controlled so deeply by their financial interest in litigation and the process that governed it. 207 Today, the ideological composition of the Committee is very different. For example, Stempel notes that when the 2000 discovery amendments were adopted, the Committee's practitioners were predominantly defense-side, with only one plaintiff-side attorney as a member. 20 ' He connects this ideological divide to particular political affiliations. In the case of the 2000 discovery amendments, six of the eight judges on the Committee were Republican appointees. 2 09 Based on this ideological composition and his individual assessment of the discovery rules, members in the slightest; in my personal experience, the Committee members, no matter their background, are at pains to be evenhanded and fair. But, the reality is that an individual's view of the way the rules should be structured is heavily informed by her experience with the civil justice system. When a committee member has only worked for defense-side interests, it is only human nature to instinctively move toward positions based on that knowledge. In other words, empirical evidence is powerful, but individual experience can often trump that empiricism. Moreover, when fellow committee members echo this experience, it gives the common story greater credibility within the group. Anecdotal evidence is persuasive but, as scholars like Deborah Hensler have noted, it has dubious reliability.
222
My proposal is not to litmus-test every individual that sits on the Committee or to look at whether they self-identify as a Republican or a Democrat. That kind of inquiry-one that Professor Stempel might support-would simply politicize the process even further. 223 Rather, I argue for greater experiential balance on the Committee, not for ideological balance. The composition should reflect all interests of those who appear in federal court. My suggestion would go beyond balancing big corporate defense lawyers against big institutional plaintiff lawyers-although that is a good start. Lawyers that have smaller and different practice areas should also be represented. This would mean that interests outside of mass-litigation would be better represented on the Committee, and the Committee would have a broader understanding of how the Civil Rules affect the full spectrum of litigation in federal courts. In other words, in addition to empirical studies of the rules and the common experience of particular committee members, there would be anecdotes from all corners of the litigation story. This would give access concerns a better voice in the maintain balance in the civil justice system for the benefit of the public." Associate Member Law Firm Registration Form, http://www.lfcj.com/admin/documentadministration/document.cfin?DocumentD=585 (last visited May 4, 2009). Moreover, while the public comments and attendance at hearings are often sparse, when a rule is particularly controversial, the public comments and hearing participation increases. This means that there is greater "interest-group" participation and an even greater need to ensure the committee is viewed as balanced and measured. For instance, the Committee received over 300 comments and had over seventy testimonials for the 1998 discovery rules. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (May 11, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV05-1999.pdf. This issue has been noted in other committees as well. Jack Weinstein's reflections regarding his service on the Evidence Rules Committee include a critique that the advisory committee "had no representatives of some of the younger groups in the law profession, such as those representing poverty agencies." WEINSTEIN, supra note 167, at 10. He also noted that "conservative elements of Congress, represented by Senator McClellan, and the Department of Justice probably had an impact greater than" groups representing criminal defendant interests. Id. at 10-11. Those groups were not members of the committee.
222. Hensler notes Anecdotes, no matter how individually compelling, are an inadequate substitute for systematic analysis of the interrelationship between the legal system and the economy, because critical details that could determine what inferences we derive from an anecdote are often missing. Also, we have no way of telling whether an anecdote represents a common or aberrant occurrence, which we need to know to decide how much weight to assign the anecdote. Deborah R. Hensler, Dr. Hensler Replies, 75 JUDICATURE 254, 254 (1992).
223. Stempel, supra note 105, at 637 ("On a longer term, but perhaps more elusive level, policymakers should consider fine-tuning the generally wise Rules Enabling Act process to ensure that the various committees are more evenly balanced in socio-political makeup."). Stempel advocates doing this by appointing a more balanced committee, and if the Chief Justice will not do so, then by taking the power away from him and allowing another body to make appointments. Id. 
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Committee; yet, by remaining an appointed rulemaking body and not an elected one, this representation would come without the electoral distortions already discussed. 224 The major criticism of these composition proposals is that they do not go far enough to restore access as a co-equal principle of civil rulemaking. Substituting committee members and involving Congress will not guarantee that access will be considered. And, at least with respect to the proposal to involve Congress, it might even add further complication to an already cumbersome process. This is a valid criticism, but I counter with two points. The first is that no reform can assure perfection in rulemaking. These proposals are intended to move the ball in the right direction by bringing broader perspectives to the rulemaking process. The second response is that more radical reforms would be necessary to restore access with certainty.
One more aggressive reform would require rulemaking legislation. In that legislation, Congress could mandate that access be considered in the rulemaking process. To enforce that legislation, Congress would have to put a monitoring mechanism in place. There are a range of possibilities for how this mechanism could be structured. The Committee itself (or the Standing Committee) could verify that access was considered in the rule process and provide a report outlining the rules' impact on access. Another possibility is for an outside body like the Federal Judicial Center to serve this function. Similar to Professor Geyh's proposal for an independent commission, the Federal Judicial Center could monitor the rulemaking process and substantiate the impact of the proposed rules. 225 The difficulty with involving an outside body is that the judiciary will likely resist that effort. As previous efforts to bring in a monitoring entity have shown, the judicial branch is not keen on such oversight. 226 Even without this verification, there may still be value to Congress articulating access as a valid rulemaking principle. The major obstacle in getting such legislation passed is inertia. Without a willingness to articulate a rulemaking mandate in the first place, it is unlikely that access on its own will drive Congress to pass such legislation. Yet, while not the most feasible solution, an articulation of what the Civil Rules should achieve would go a long way to restoring access. 227 Finally, as already discussed, the civil rulemaking process is but one part of the litigation system. As long as other institutions restrict access in response to the litigation explosion, access will suffer. I acknowledge that civil rulemaking cannot change this reality on its own. By recovering access as a goal of the Civil Rules and by proposing some structural reforms that may aid in restoring this goal, a dialogue about the guiding principles of civil rulemaking has begun. The dialogue will remain only that, however, unless Congress and other institutional actors reemphasize access in our civil justice system. CONCLUSION The history of the Enabling Act and original rules demonstrates that access was a fundamental purpose of the Civil Rules. Over time, the place of access has diminished, and in order to restore that principle, the structure of the civil rulemaking process should be modified. By modifying the Committee's composition and articulating a rulemaking mandate that incorporates access, access can become the co-equal rulemaking principle the Enabling Act proponents envisioned.
More broadly, by thinking critically about access and how institutional forces impact it, we can assess how the values of our civil litigation system have become more utilitarian over time. In a context where there is a movement to restrict litigation, restoring access in civil rulemaking may cabin the impact of that trend. By reframing the values ofjustice and efficiency with reference to litigants, and less so with reference to the system, perhaps we can get closer to striking a reasonable balance among competing fairness and efficiency concerns, both in the civil litigation system as a whole and the civil rulemaking process as we know it.
